To facilitate work in discourse interpretation, the logical form of English sentences should be both close to English and syntactically simple. In this paper i propose s logical notation which is first-order and uonintensional, sad for which semantic tnmslation can be naively compositional. The key move is to expand what kinds of entities one allows in one's ontology, rather than complicating the logical notation, the logical form of sentences, or the semantic translation process. Three classical problemsopaque adverbials, the distinction between de re and de ditto belief reports, and the problem of identity in intensional contexts -are examined for the dil~cuities they pose for this logical notation, and it is shown that the difficulties can be overcome. The paper closes with s statement about the view of semantics that is presupposed by this appro,-'h.
Motivation
The real problem in natural language processing is the interpretation of discourse. Therefore, the other aspects of the total process should be in the service of discourse interpretation. This includes the semantic translation of sentences into s logical form, and indeed the logical notation itsel£ Discourse interpretation processes, as ! see them, are inferential processes that manipulate or perform deductions on logical expressions encoding the information in the text and on other logical expressions encoding the speaker's and helper's background knowledge. These considerations lead to two principal criteria for • logical notation.
Criterion I: The notation should be as close to English as possible. This makes it easier to specify the rules for translation between English and the formal language, mad also makes it easier to encode in logical notation facts we normally think of in English. The ideal choice by this criterion is English itself, but it fails monumentally on the second criterion.
Criterion lh The notation should be syntactically simple. Since discourse processes are to be defined primarily in terms of manipulations performed on expressions in the logical notation, the simpler that notation, the easier it will be to define the discourse operations.
The development of such a logical notation is usually taken to be a very hard problem, i believe this is because researchers have imposed upon themselves several additional constraintsto adhere to stringent ontological scruples, to explain a number of mysterious syntactic facts ms a by-product of the notation, and to encode efficient deduction techniques in the notation.
Most representational difficulties go •way if one rejects these constraints, and there are good reasons for rejecting each of the constr~nts.
Ontological scruples: Researchers in philosophy and lint~uis-tics have typically restricted themselves to very few (altho*Igh • strange assortment of) kinds of entities -physical objects, numbers, sets, times, possible worlds, propositions, events, and situations -mad all of these but the first have been controversial. Quine has been the greatest exponent of ontological chastity, ills argument is that in any scientific theory, "we adopt, at [east insofas* as we are reasonable, the simplest conceptual scheme into which the disordered fragments of our experience can be fitted and arranged.* (Quine, 1953, p. 16 .) But he goes on to say that "simplicity ... is not a clear and unambiguous idea; and it is quite capable of presenting a double or multiple standard." (Ibid., p. 17.) Minimising kinds of entities is not the only way to achieve simplicity in a theory. The aim in this enterprise is to achieve simplicity by minimizing the complexity of the rules in the system. It turns out this can be achieved by multiplying kinds of entities, by' allowing as an entity everything that can be referred to by a noun phrase.
Syntactic explanation: The argument here is easy. It would be pleasant if an explanation of, say, the syntactic behavior of count nouns and mass nouns fell out of our underlying ontological structure at no extra cost, but if the extra cost is great complication in statements of discourse operations, it would be quite unpleasant. In constructing a theory of discourse interpretation, it doesn't make sense for us to tie our hands by requiring syntsctie explanations as well. The problem of discourse is at least an order of maguitude harder than the problem of syntax, and syntax shouldn't be in the driver's seat.
Efficient deduction: There is • long tradition in artificial intelligence of building control information into the notation. and indeed much work in knowledge representation is driven by this consideration. Semantic networks and other notational systems built ,round hierarchies (Quillian, 1068; .~immons, 1973; Hendrix, 1975) implicitly assign a low cost to certain types of syllogistic remmning. The KL-ONE representation language (Schmolze and Brat.brunn, 1982 ) has a variety of notational devices, each with an associated efficient deduction procedure. Hayes (1979) has argued that frame representations (Minsky, 1975; Bobrow and Winogrsd, 1977) should be viewed am sets of predicate calculus axioms together with a control component for drawing certain kinds of inferences quickly. In quite a different vein, Moore (1980) uses a possible worlds notation to model knowledge mad action in part to avoid inefficiencies in theoremproving.
By contrast, l would argue against building et §ciencies into the notation. From a psychological point of view, this allows us to abstract away from the details of implementation on a particular computational device, increasing the generality of the theory. From a technological point of view, it reflects a belief that we must first determine empirically the must common classes of inferences required for discourse processing and only then seek algorithms for optimizing them.
In this paper I propme s flit logical notation with an ontologically promiscuous semantics. One's first naive guess as to how to represent a simple sentence like A boy builds s boat. is as follows:
This simple approach seems to break down when we encounter the more ditcuit phenomena of natural language, like tense, intensional contexts, and adverbials, as in the sentence A boy wanted to build a boat quickly.
These phenomena have led students of language to introduce significant complications in their logical notations for representing sentences. My approach will be to maintain the syntactic simplicity of the logical notation and expand the theory of the world implicit in the semantics to accommodate this simplicity. The representation of the =hove sentence, as is justified below, is
That is, el occurred in the peat, where el is z's wanting e~, which is the quickness of us, which is z's building of y, where z is a boy and y is a boat. In brief, the logical form of natural language sentences will be a conjunction of atomic predications in which all variables are existentially quantified with the widest poesible scope. Predicates will be identical or nearly identical to natural language morphemes. There will be no ftmctious, fun¢*ionals, nested quantifiers, disjunctions, negations, or modal or inteusional op erators.
3 The Logical Notation Davidson (1967) proposed a treatment of action sentences in which events are treated as individuals. This facilitated the representation of sentences with time and place adverbials. Thus we can view the sentences John ran on Monday. John ran in Sin Fnmciaco.
as mmerting the existence of & ruxming event by John and asserting a relation between the event and Monday or San Francisco. We can similarly view the sentence John ran slowly.
as expressing an attribute about a running event. Treating events as individuals is abe useful beemme they can be acgumerits of statements about cremes:
Because he wanted to get there first, John ran. Because John ran, he arrived sooner than anyone else.
They can be the objects of propositional attitudes:
Bill was surprised that John ran.
Finally, this approach accomodates the facts that events can be nominalized and can be referred to pronominally:
John's running tired him out. John ran, and Bill saw it.
But virtually every predication that can he made in natural language can be specified u to time and place, be modified adverbially, function a~ a cause or effect of something else, be the object of a propositional attitude, be nominalized, and be referred to by a pronoun. It is therefore convenient to extend Davidson's approach to all predications. That is, corresponding to any predication that can he made in natural lan~tage, we will say there is an event, or state, or condition, or sitl=ation. or "eventuality', or whatever, in the world that it refer~ to. This approach might he called "ontnlogical promiscuity'. 0lie abandons all ontological scruples.
Thus we would like to have in our logical notation the possibility of an extra argument in e~h predication referring to the "condition" that exists when that predication is true. However. especially for expository convenience, we would like to retain the option of not specifying that extra argument when it is not needed and would only get in our way. Ilence, I propose a logical notation that provides two sets of predicates fhat are ~ystem-atically related, by introducing what might I)e railed a "nominalization" operator '. (:orresponding lu every rl-ary predicate p there will he an n + I-ary predicalc i ~t who.~e (i~t argqlnlenl can he thought of a.~ the condilion that }mhl~ '*hen p is rnw of the suhsequent ar~lments. Thus. if r..(J) me,~ns that .John runs, run'(E, J) means that /': is a running event hy ,John. or John's running, if slipperv(F ) means that floor F is slippery, then Jlipperv~(E, F) means that ~" is the condition of F's being slippery, or F's slipperiness. The effect of this notational maneuver is to provide handles by which various predications can be grasped by higher predications. A similar approach haL~ been in many AI systems. In discourse one not only makes predications about such ephemera as events, states and conditions. One also refers to crttities that do not actually exist. Our notation must thus have a way of referring to such entities. We therefore take our model to he a Platonic universe which contains everything that can he spoken of -objects, events, states, conditions -whether they exist in the real world or not. It then may or may not be a property of such entities that they exist in the real world. In the sentence 
Ezistl E) A morshipt( E, JOHN, ZEUS)
This implies ~'zist(JOHN) but not Ezist(Zbft;,b')..~imilarly, the logical form of "John wants to fly" is IOns need not adhere to Platonism to accept the Platonic universe. It ran be viewed a~ t socially constituted, or conventional, con.true:ion, which is never~hele~ highly constrained by :he way the (not directly accessible} material world is. The degree of constraint is variable. We are more constrained by the miteriaJ world to belie~ in trees and chairs, le~ so to believe in patriotism or ghosts.
iThe re~der might chaos# to think ot" the Platonic universe u the univenm of pmmibln individuals, although 1 do not want to exclude Io~eallll impossible individua/s, such •-the condition John helio~ to exist when he believe; 6 + 7 --15. The following sentellce illustrates the exleHt Ii) ~'hich we must have a way of eel)resenting existent and llOlle',~i',l~'tlt ',i;iles and events ill ordinary discourse. there are the int,.coals of time IX May and "la:-,i' week', the a.s yet llOlleNi',ll'nt Chilly. l.he ( 'hannrl "l',miwl, an in,Ii+idlial revealing ew'llt and the complex cw.nt ,~f lhc ,~Jllnli{il meeting, which actually oecllrred, a set of real refu.~als (listrihuled acr{)~s time in a l)articular way, a denial event whieil did not occur, and a vetoing event whh'h may or may {lot have occurred.
IM¢Cal~hy (1997) employs a simtlar technique.

E=ist(E:) ^ wand(E:, JOHN, El) A fly'(E~, JOHN)
This implies Ezist{JOHN) but not Ezist(EI)
Let us lake P,ist{/fs) to mean that Ea existed in the pant and Perfect{E,) to mean what the peril'el lense means, m*l~hly. 
A last-e,eck( bfa )
Of lhe vario.s enliti{-~ real'reed In. Slit" 4cnleliee. via .sprained predicate4, a.sseris lhe t.xisilonel , of a lypir;tl reflisal ['it ill ,1. "~el of reilisals and Ihe rt.vrlaiion /'.',~. 'l'hl. r\i-i,.nc,. ,,f lit,, rq,flisal implies the exi.~lclieC {,f Ihe ~ovi'rilllll'lll h ,t,>,'-il,,i illil;l~ the eXislenee {~f the dcllial; quile Ihe ,llllll,~li,' h iii;i)' ~llt.*.¢t,-I {hi' egi~i.ellel. +if the vein. |lut ccrlainl) d{.'., lllll imply il. TI., r~'~ela-lion /fa, liowever, implies the existence of both the Nero Scientist 4Mere properly, we shnuld say ",'sist~ntially transparent" ~n,t "e×lsten. NS and the at relation E4, which in turn implies the existence of the veto and the meeting. These then imply the existence of Margaret Thatcher MT and President Mitterand PM, but not the Channel Tunnel CT. Of course, we know about the existence of some of these entities, such ms Margaret Thatcher and President Mitterand, for reasons other than the transparency of predicates.
Sentence (4) shows that virtually anything can be embedded in a higher predication. This is the reason, in the logical notstins, for flattening everything into predications about individuMs.
There are four serious problems that must be dealt with if this approach is to work -quantifiers, opaque adverbials, the distinction between de re and de ditto readings of belief reports, and the problem of identity in intensional contexts.
I have described a solution to the quantifier problem elsewhere (Hobbs, 1983). Briefly, universally quantified variables are reified ms typical elements of sets, existential quantification inside the scope of universally quantified variables are handled by means of dependency functions, and the quantifier structure of sentences is encoded in indices on predicates. In this paper i will address only the other three problems in detail.
3 Opaque Adverbials [t seems reasonably natural to treat transparent adverbials as properties of events. For opaque adverbials, like "almost", it seems lees natural, and one is inclined to follow Reichenbach (1947} in treating them ms ftmctionais mapping predicates into predicates. Thus, John is almost a man.
would he represented
almo,t( man )( J )
That is, almos~ maps the predicate man into the predicate "almost a man', which is then applied to John.
This representation is undesirable for our purposes since it is not first-order. It would be preferable to treat opaque operators as we do transparent ones, ms properties of events or conditions. The sentence would be represented
almost(E) A manl( E, J)
But does this get as into dil~cuity?
First note that this representation does not imply that John is a man, for we have not asserted g's existence in the real world, and almo,t is opaque and does not imply its argument's existence.
But is there enough information in E to allow one to determine the truth value of aimomt(E) in isolation; without appeal to other facts? The answer is that there could he. We can construct a model i~ which for every functional F there is a corresponding equivalent predicate q, such that The existence of the model shows that this condition is not necessarily contradictory.
Let the ,miverse of discourse D be the class of finite sets built out of a finite set of urelements. The interpretation of a constant X will be some element of D; call it I(X). The fact that we can define such a predicate q in a moderately rich model means that we are licensed to treat opaque adverbials as properties of events and conditions. The purpose of this exercise is only to show the viability of the approach. I am not claiming that a running event *8 an ordered pair of the runner and the .set of all runners, although it should he harmless enough for those irredeemably committed to set-theoretic semantics to view it like that.
It should be noted that this treatment of adverbials has consequences for the individuating criteria on eventualities. We can say "John is almost a man ~ without wishing to imply "John is almost a mammal," so we would not want to say that John's being a man is the same condition as his being a mammal. We are forced, though not unwillingly, into a position of individuating eventualities ,,,'cording to very fine-grained criteria. pretation is likely if some man is sitting at the table next to the speaker of the sentence, and John is nowhere around but knows the man otherwise and suspects him to be a spy. A sentence that very nearly forces the de re reading is John believes Bill's mistress is Bill's wife/ whereas the sentence John believes Russian consulate employees are spies. strongly indicates a de ditto reading. In the tie re reading of (5), John is not necessarily taken to know that the man is in fact at the next table, but he is normally a.ssumed to be able to identify the man somehow. More on ~identil'y" below. In the de divan reading John believes there is a man who is both at the next table and t spy, but may be otherwise unable to identify the man. The de re reading of (5) is usually taken to support the inference (6) There is someone John believes to be a spy.
whereas the de ditto reading supports the weaker inference (7) John believes that someone is a spy.
YThi-,~x"~mple is due to Moore and Hendrix (1982) .
As Quine has pointed out, as usually interpreted, the first of these sentences is false for most of us, the second one true. A common notational maneuver (though one that Quine rejects) is to represent this distinction as a scope ambigafity. Sentence (6) is encoded as (8) and (7) as (9): (8) (~z)believe(J, spy(z)) (9) believe(J, (3z)spy(z))
If one adopts this notation and stipulates what the expressions mean, then there are certainly distinct ways of representing the two sentences. But the interpretation of the two expressions is not obvious. It is not obvious for example that (8) could not cover the case where there is an individual such that John believes him to be a spy but has never seen him and knows absolutely nothing else about him -not his name, nor his appearance, nor his location at any point in time -beyond the fact that he is a spy.
In fact. the notation we propose takes (8) to be the most neutral representation. Since quantification is over entities in the Platonic universe, (8) says that there is some entity in the Platonic universe such that John believes of that. entity that it is a spy. Expression 
) A spy'(P.S)
Anything else that John believes about this entity must be stated explicitly. In particular, the de dieto reading of (5) would be represented by something like ( 
11) believe(J, P) A spy'(P, S) A believe( J, Q) A at'(Q, S, T)
where T is the next table. That is, John believes that S is a spy and that .q is at the next table. John may know many other propcriies about S and still fall short of knowing ,rho the spy is. There is a range of possibilities for John's knowledge, from the bare statements of (lO) and (It) that correspond to a ,le ditto reading to the full-blown knowledge of S's hh'ntity that is normally present in a de re reading. In fact, an FBI agent would progress through just such a range of belief states on his way to identifying the spy.
To state John's knowledge of S's identity properly, we wo*tld have to state explicitly John's belief in a potentially very large collection of properties of the spy. To arrive at a succinct way of representing knowledge of identity in our notation, let us con. sider the two pairs of equivalent sentences:
What is that? Identify that.
The FBI doesn't know who the spy is. The FBI doesn't know the spy's identity.
The answer to the question "Who are you?" and what is required before we can say that we know who someone is or that we know their identity is a highly context-dependent matter. Several years ago, before I had ever seen Kripke, if someone had asked me whether I knew who Saul Kripke was, I would have said, ~Yes. tle's the author of Naming and Neeessd~. ~ Then once ! was at a workshop which I knew was being attended by Kripke, but I didn't yet know what he looked like. If someone had asked me whether I knew who Kripke was, I would have had to say, "No. * The relevant property in that context, was not, his authorship of some paper, but any property that distinguished him from the others present, such as "the malt in the back row holding a cup of coffee*.
Knowledge of a person's identity is then a matter of knowing some context-dependent essential property that serves to identify that person for present purposes -that is, a matter of knowing who he or she is.
Therefore, we need a kind of place-holder predicate to stand for this essential property, that in any particular context can be specified more precisely. It happens that English has a morpheme that serves just this function -the morplwme "wh" Let us then posit a predicate u,h that stands for the contextually ,tetermined property or conjunction of properfes that wotild coiult as an identification in that particular context.
The de re reading of (5) 
believe{J. 1)) A spv'(l'. X) A kno.,( I. c~) A u,h'(~.~, X)
That is. (12) . Jlult'ment,; are sonil'iiml"~ linci'rlaill ~K4 to whether sentence 5 is appropriatc in these circllms/ances, but it is certain that the sentence John believes someone at the next table is a spy.
is appropriate, and that is sufficient for the argument.
It seems then that the toni,nets know(J. R) and ~,h'(R.S)
are not part of "#hat we want in the initial logical form of the sentence, s but only a very common conversational implicature. The reason the implicature is very. common is that if iAnother way of putting it: they are not part. of the literal meaning of the sentenc;e.
John doesn't know that the man is at the next table, there must be some other description under which John is familiar with the man. The story I just told provides such a description, but not one sufficient for identifying the man.
This analysis is attractive since it allows us to view the de rede dicto distinction problem u just one instance of a much more general problem, namely, the existential status of the grammatically subordinated material in sentences. Generally, such material takes on the tense of the sentence. Thus, in
The boy built the boat.
a building event by z of y takes place in the past, and we assume that a was a boy in the past, at the time of the building. But in Many rich men studied computer science in college.
the most natural reading is not that the men were rich when they were studying computer science but that they are rich now. In
The flower is artificial.
there is an entity z which is described as a flower, and z exists, but its "flower-hess" does not exist in the real world. Rather, it is a condition which is embedded in the opaque predicate "artificial'.
It was stated above that the representation (10) for the de ditto reading conveys no properties of S other than that John believes him to be a spy. In particular, it does not convey S's existence in the real world. S thus refers to a possible individual, who may turn out to be ,wtual if, for example, John ever comes to be able to identify the person whom he believes to be the spy, or if there is some actual spy who has given John good cause for his suspicions.
However, S may not be actual, only possible. Suppose this is the case. One common objection to possible individuals is that they may seem to violate the Law of the Excluded Middle. Is S married or not married? Our intuition is that the question is inappropriate, and indeed the answer given in our formalism has this flavor. By axiom (3), married(S) is really just an abbreviation for married'( g, S) ^ gzist(E). This is false, for the existence of E in the real world would imply the existence of S.
So married(S) is also false. But its falsity has nothing to do with S's marital status, only his existential status. The predication unmarried(S) is false for the same reason. The primed predicates are basic, and for them the problem of the excluded middle does not arise. The predication maeried'(E, S) is true or false depending on whether E is the condition of S's being married. An unprimed, trmxsparent predicate carries along with it the existence of its arguments, and it can fail to be true of an entity either through the entity being actual but not having that property or through the nonexistence of the entity.
Identity in Belief Contexts
The final problem I will consider arises in de dieto belief reports.
It is the problem of identity in intensional contexts, raised by grege (1892). One way of stating the problem is this. Why is it that if 
Ezist(Qi) ^ Ezist(Q2)
The uniqueness of the proper name "Evening Star" is expressed by the axiom
The identity of the Evening Star and the Morning Star is expressed
(V~)Eoening-,~;lar(~) ----Aforning-b'tar(z)
From all of this we can infer that the Morning Star M,q is also an Evening Star and hence is identical to ES;, and hence can be substituted into ri.se'(Pi, E.S') to give rise'(PI, MS). Then we have
believe( J, P, ) A vine'( P,, M S ) A believe( J, Q: ) AMorning-b'tar'(Q:, MS)
This is a representation for tile paradoxical sentence (15) . There are three possibilities for dealing with this proi)lem. The first is to discard or restrict I,eibniz's Law. The second is to deny that the Evening ~tar and the Morning Star are identical a.s entities in the Platonic universe; they only happen to he identical in the real world, and that is not sullieient for intersubstitutivity The third is to deny that expression (16) represents ~entence (14) because "the Evening Star" in (14) does not refer to what it seems to refer to.
The first possibility is the approach of researchers who treat belief as an operator rather than as a predicate, and then re. strict substitution inside the operator. ~ We cannot avail ourselves of this. solution bec.ause of the flatness of our notation. In any case, this approach does not seem wise in view of the central importance played ia discourse interpretation by the identity of differently presented entities, i.e. by coreference. Free intersubstitutibility of identicals seems a desirable property to preser'se.
The second possible answer to Frege's problem is to say that in the Platonic universe, the Morning Star and the Evening Star *This ia a purely syntactic approach, and whPn one tries to construct • semantics for it, one is generally driven to the third possibility.
are different entities. It just happens chu in the res/world they are idemical. But it is not true that E$ = MS, for equality, like quantification, is over entities in the Platonic universe. The fact that E,.~ and MS ate identical in the real wodd (call this relation rw-identicai) must be stated explicitly, say, by the expression
r~-identical( E S, MS)
or more properly, Them would be such an sx/om for the ~¢ u.gument o( bei*eve but not for its referentially opaque second srlrumeut.
A.z/ome will express the fact that r,~.idzntiea~ is an equlvs.
lence relation: This solution is in the spirit of our whole representational ~p. preach in ch*~ it forces tm co be paln(ully expticit about every. chm~. The notation does no magic for us. There is a sit, nificant cost a~.socis:ed with th~s solution, however. When proper names • re represented u predicates sad not u constants, the natural way co state the uniqueness o( proper names is by mesas o( axioms of the foiiowin¢ sort: The very common problems involving ressomn K shout equality, which can be done elRciently, are thus translated into problems involvinf resmnm~ shout the predicate re.identical, which is very cumbersome.
One way to view Ch/s second solution is ~ a l~x co the first solucian. For "=*" we substitute the relation r~;-qden~,cad, ~md by means of axiom schema (17), we force substitutions co propagate to the eventualities they occur in, and we force the distinction between referentially transparent and referentially opaque predicates to be made explicitly. It is thus an indirect way of rejecting L,eibnis' Law. The third solution is to say that "the Eveninf Star* in sentents (14) does not really refer to the Evening Star, but co some abstract entity somehow related to the Evenin~ Star. That is. sentence (14) is re-fly en example of metonymy. This may seem counterintuitive, sad even bizarre, at first blush. But in fact the most widely *,'espied clmmical solutions to the problem of identiw ate of thn, flavor. Foe Fre~e (1892) "the Evening Star ~ in sentence (14) does no* refer co the Evenin~ Star but co the tenme of the phrsac "the Evening Star ~. [n a more recent approar.h, Zalta (1983) ts~es such noun phrases co refer co "abstrict objects" related to the resJ object. In both approaches noun phrues in intemional context~ refer co senses or abstract objects, while other noun phrues refer co actual entities, sad so it is necessary co specify which predicates are intensioa*,l. [n a Manta{avian approach, "the Evening Star" would be taken to refer co the inter.on o( the Evening Star, not its e=te~*on in the real world, sad noun phrases would al,vays be taken co refer co intensions, -Ithough for nonintensional predicates there would be mesmng postulates chat make this equivalent co reference co extensions.
Thus, in all these approaches intentional and extensional predicates must be distintmished explicitly, sad noun phrs~s in intensional contexts are systematically interpreted metonymically.
It would be em,y enouch in our framework co implement these q3proaches. We c,m define a function a o( three arguments -the actual entity, the co,niter, sad the condition used co describe the entity -chat returns the sense, or intention, or abstract entity, corresponding co the ~ctual entity for chat ¢ognizer ~nd that condition. Sentence (14) would be represented, not ~ (16 The dif~culty with this approach is that it makes the interpeeration o/" noun phrases dependent on their embedding context:
[ntensionai context -* me¢onymlc interpretation Extensional context --noumetonymic interpretation
It thus violates, though not soriousiy, the nmve com~tionaiity that [ have been at so many pehm to preserve. Metonymy is a very common phenomenon in discourse, but l prefer to think o( it as occurring irregularly, sad not 8a siKnalled systematieafly by other elemenu, in the sentence.
Having laid out the three possible solutious and their sho~-¢ominKs, [ find tha~ [ would like to avoid the problem o/" identity altogether. The third sppro.-'h suggests a ruse for doing so. We can amume tha~, in general, (16) is the representation of sentence (14). We invoke no extra complications where we don't have to. When, in interpreting the text, we encounter a difficulty resulting from the problem o/' identity, we can go back and revise our in~rprocatmn o( (14), by mmuming the reference rmmt have been a metonymie one to the sbstr-,'t entity and not to the actual entity. In theee cm it would be ts if we m'e saying, "John couldn't believe about the Evening Star itself that it is rising. The par'edox shows that he is insufficiently acquamted with the Evening Star to refer to it ~metly. He must be talking about an abetr~t entity rotated to the Rvenmg Star." My ~less is the, we will not have to resort to thin run often, for [ suapect the problem rarely srmes in acmad dim:ouume interpre~ion.
The tLole of Semantics
Let me cla~ by making some commenm about ways of doing semantics. Semangcs is the =temp~.d specification of the reIn, ion between language and ¢he world. However, this requires a theory of the world. There is a ,peetrtun of choices one can make in this retard. At one end o/' the spectrum -l~'s say the right end -one can *,/opt the "coreeet" theory of the wodd, the theory Oven by quantum mechsmcs u~/ the other sciences. If or=. doe= this, .emantics become= impmmbte because it is no lem than Ill of sr../e~m, a fset that has led Fodur (1980) to exp~ some deapmr. Thor's mo much o( a m/smasch between the way we view the wodd and the way che wodd reaily is. At ~he left end, oue can mmume a theory o( the w~dd that is isomorphic to the way we caik -hour it. Whmt [ have been doing in this paper, in fact, is an effort to work out the deem ~-in such = theory. In this cue. semantics becomes very neudy trivial Meet activity in ~emmtics today is slightly to toe ,~t of the extreme left end of this spectrum. One makes certam smumptious about the nature of the wodd that timely mflt~t 18nKumle, and doesn't make certain other alumptions. Where one h .= fa~ed to m -~,. the neceeac~, aesumpoons, pusaies app~w, tnd semanr~i¢~ becomes an effort to soive those puzzles. Neve~heiess, it fsils to move far enough away from langms~e to re, reseat d~nifieant pt~gre~ cows~t the tight end of the sl~.etrum. The pmition [ advocate is that there is no remmn to make our task mo~ difficult. We wdl have pus~des enough to mlve when we get m diseourae.
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